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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
x Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
x Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
x Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
x Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
x Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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x Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
x Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
x Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
x Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
x Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
x Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
x Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
x Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Dr. McMichael is a graduate of Princeton University, and he received his advanced degrees at the 
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Developing Program Management Leadership for Acquisition 
Reform 
Neil McCown—CDR Neil McCown has served in the U.S. Navy for 18 years, including three 
deployments to the Persian Gulf and operational tours flying tactical, training, and transport aircraft. 
He recently completed in-resident study at the Naval War College and is currently assigned to 
OPNAV N09X, Enterprise Integration and Analysis. [neilmccown@hotmail.com] 
Abstract 
Recent reform measures in acquisition processes support the acquisition 
community’s long-established goal of providing warfighters with the highest quality 
and most cost-effective weapons systems. Since the role of the Program Manager 
remains pivotal to overall program success or failure, efforts to reform the acquisition 
community must supplement and expand traditional expectations of PMs, focusing 
on four key concepts: ensuring leadership continuity, providing systems engineering 
training, requiring increased hands-on training, and employing trust-building tools. 
The turnaround of the USAF C-17 program illustrates the successful effects of 
building trust among program stakeholders. With these qualities, PMs leading the 
development of future weapons systems will unquestionably contribute to the U.S. 
military’s sustained role as the most capable, powerful, and respected military in the 
world. 
Introduction 
Relative to its closest competitors, the United States military stands alone as the 
most capable, powerful, and respected military in the world. The Department of Defense 
(DoD) acquisition community, charged with providing the U.S. warfighter with the highest 
quality and most cost-effective weapons systems, is arguably as important to maintaining 
that superiority as the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard. Yet despite 
little acknowledgement or recognition, the health of that community is rarely addressed. 
Although characteristics of the acquisition workforce and the defense acquisition system 
itself may contribute to recent program cost and schedule overruns, the role of the Program 
Manager (PM) remains pivotal to the program’s overall success or failure. As a result, efforts 
to reform the acquisition community must supplement and expand traditional expectations of 
PMs, focusing on four key concepts: ensuring leadership continuity, providing systems 
engineering training, requiring a minimum level of hands-on training, and employing trust-
building tools.  
Acquisition Reform and the Program Manager 
The acquisition community has seen an unfortunate rise in the number of reasons for 
reform. Shifting system requirements, poor cost estimating, or errant program oversight 
have plagued numerous recent programs. In some cases, one or more of those factors have 
completely stalled defense programs, some of which include the Armed Reconnaissance 
Helicopter, Combat Search and Rescue replacement (CSAR-X), VH-71 Marine One 
replacement, and Armed Common Sensor. In fact, the total budget excess of the DoD’s 
largest 95 acquisition programs has been $295 billion, and those programs’ schedules have 
slipped an average of two years. Current trends indicate that, without significant change, 
cost overruns will continue in an unsustainable manner. 
 =
=




Several characteristics of today’s acquisition workforce complicate efforts to reverse 
these trends. First, compared to its workload, it is grossly understaffed. Over the previous 20 
years, the DoD eliminated a large number of its acquisition positions in an effort to correct 
historic problems and cut costs. In doing so, it lost many of the positions responsible for 
building a solid foundation during the early stages of a program; applying that expertise 
during that time period is arguably the most critical factor for ensuring a program remains on 
track throughout its life cycle. Next, organizational issues limit the acquisition workforce from 
being fully recognized as a professional component. Dominant among those issues is the 
notion that the acquisition community operates with insufficient regard for combatant 
commander’s needs, resulting in weapons systems that fail to adequately address the most 
pressing threats facing warfighters. Third, a significant portion of the workforce is nearing 
retirement age. Finally, more lucrative opportunities in the private sector are an irresistible 
pull for many in the workforce. 
Fundamental qualities of the defense acquisition system further hamper efforts at 
change. At its core, it has more in common with a business enterprise than other functions 
within government. This remains true even though the defense acquisition system 
represents the world’s most powerful customer, who sets and enforces procurement rules. 
Furthermore, the government continues to promote cumbersome, bureaucratic processes, 
which emphasize the pursuit of “exquisite” weapons systems and are reluctant to pursue 
“good enough” —though possibly somewhat imperfect— systems. The outcome is an 
acquisition system which is unable to produce desirable results in an efficient manner. 
Characterized by a pervasive lack of trust, the relationship between the DoD, 
Congress, and the Defense Industry (known as the “Iron Triangle”) remains an additional 
challenge to defense acquisition. The varying perspectives and motivations of each member 
of the Iron Triangle test the ethical foundation of the entire enterprise. Striving to achieve 
profits and shareholder value, the Defense Industry is strongly tempted to overpromise on 
capabilities. At the same time, the executive branch and the DoD display a frequent 
tendency to modify requirements and specifications during the course of a weapon system’s 
development as threat conditions evolve and leadership changes. These alterations 
consequently increase cost and create schedule delays. The interests of the constituents in 
their districts and a desire to retain control of programs through selective spending, 
meanwhile, drive the actions of Congress. Throughout the Iron Triangle, self-interested 
members of each corner resist changing the acquisition system due to the financial and 
career incentives it offers. 
Non-military issues draw congressional attention and funds away from acquisition 
programs, and without funds necessary to sustain the existing bureaucracy, pressure builds 
to fix the inefficient defense acquisition processes that saddle U.S. national security. Fiscal 
pressures are numerous: coping with the health care crisis, ensuring a stable supply of 
energy, preserving the natural environment, restoring the world economy, rebuilding the 
U.S. physical infrastructure, and others.  
While numerous factors contribute to a need for defense acquisition reform, 
particularly from a leadership perspective, the PM is at the heart of the process. Charged 
with operating within cost, schedule, and performance limits, a PM is assigned to each 
acquisition program. DoD Directive 5000.01 (USD[AT&L], 2007) provides the overarching 
policies governing the defense acquisition system, as well as a definition of the PM: 
The designated individual with responsibility for and authority to accomplish 
program objectives for development, production, and sustainment to meet the 
user’s operational needs. The Program Manager shall be accountable for 
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credible cost, schedule, and performance reporting to the Milestone Decision 
Authority. 
Although this definition accurately encapsulates the responsibilities of the PM, 
additional elements of the position may illuminate some root causes of problems the 
defense acquisition community faces. 
Continuity of Leadership 
The fact that military officers are assigned to relatively short PM tours is one potential 
source of trouble. While a typical tour for an officer rarely exceeds three years, most 
weapons systems spend far more time than that in development. As a result, it is very 
unlikely that a single PM will remain assigned to a weapons program long enough to guide it 
from its early developmental stages through fleet introduction. Indeed, due to the length of 
time required for a large program to move from one major milestone to the next, most 
military PMs are only involved with a program long enough to guide it through (at most) one 
milestone before they rotate out of the job. A military officer admittedly has the added career 
goal of gaining a broad exposure to a variety of programs, a necessary prerequisite for 
higher levels of leadership. The relative importance of this goal, however, should be 
carefully weighed in relation to its impact on the long-term success of weapon system 
programs. 
An alternative approach to ensuring continuity in program leadership is to shorten the 
duration of the program itself, which requires an examination of the underlying requirements 
process. In a broader sense, the problems facing this process can be viewed as a 
misalignment of ends and means. Military operators, representing the weapon system 
customer, understandably seek an optimum material solution to a threat scenario. Current 
trends indicate operators desire the threat be overwhelmed with an “exquisite” application of 
technology. Unfortunately, this often translates into a proposed weapon system that is 
beyond current technical capabilities. Neither the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS) process nor the Planning, Programming, Budget, and 
Execution System (PPBES) community fully address the technological uncertainty, which 
results in programmatic delays and cost escalation. 
Systems Engineering 
Although a PM may have limited ability to prevent military operators from seeking an 
unachievable capability, or to change JCIDS or PPBES, an increased emphasis on systems 
engineering skill sets may assist in identifying unrealistic requirements and managing 
technical risk early. As applied to defense acquisition, system engineering refers to the 
process of preliminary developmental planning, and importantly, it occurs prior to the 
formulation of formal requirements. In addition to considering all-new weapons systems, it 
stresses alternative solutions to perceived needs, such as commercial or foreign-made 
products, or modifications to existing systems. With the best solution identified, system 
engineering also focuses on the development of core technologies for future weapons 
systems. Not surprisingly, congressional critics have identified a lack of these skills as a 
significant source of the defense acquisition’s difficulties. 
Unfortunately, as a cost-saving measure in the 1990s, programs providing system 
engineering skills were abandoned. This, in turn, resulted in a significant degradation in the 
services’ ability to perform critical systems analysis. A renewed effort to incorporate systems 
engineering training and experience requirements for PMs, however, would provide them 
with an effective means to identify and manage technical risk. That capability may or may 
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not shorten program development cycles, but it would better prevent unforeseen cost and 
schedule overruns due to an overreliance on immature technologies. 
Training and Experience 
Although not specifically in systems engineering, some encouraging signs are 
beginning to appear that indicate improvement in training and experience requirements. The 
Defense Acquisition University, charged with educating the acquisition professionals, is 
currently engaged in active programs to ensure that the workforce has the needed skills. 
Specific measures include growing and improving training courses, increasing experience 
requirements, and enhancing workforce planning. These efforts combine with the military 
services’ leadership training, particularly professional military education programs. Mid- and 
senior-grade officials in military and civilian organizations can now take advantage of a 
considerably expanded selection of executive and leadership courses offered through the 
DAU. 
Experience remains an essential element of effective program management. The 
“management” aspect can be taught, and PMs can gain knowledge of how to apply a variety 
of processes and tools, but “leadership” ability remains distinctly different. As it relates to the 
PM role in defense acquisition, the ability to apply and gain acquisition experience is the 
leadership quality essential for effective program performance. Since the acquisition system 
and the business world have much in common, it is significant that business places a 
premium on experience. In particular, it views hands-on experience as directly related to the 
ability to make sound decisions. 
The military officer corps serve as a valuable source of acquisition professionals, yet 
operational commitments often prevent those officers from gaining the hands-on acquisition 
experience needed. One method to overcome this challenge is to create opportunities for 
officers to gain PM experience early in their careers.  
Building Trust 
Even PMs armed with high-quality experience, however, are impacted by the 
distrustful environment of the Iron Triangle. Fluctuating streams of funding from Congress, 
creeping requirements from military operators, and unrealistic performance capabilities 
promised from suppliers are common obstacles to effective cost and schedule management 
that the PM faces. Each of these results from the tendency to misrepresent actual conditions 
due to underlying motivations: pleasing constituents, exerting control, and increasing profit 
and value.  
This dishonesty—real or perceived—forms the beginning of a vicious cycle of 
mistrust. A human tendency to exaggerate perceptions of negative behavior (in this case, 
dishonesty) transforms minor actions (or misperceptions) into significant ones. A further 
tendency, referred to as the “norm of reciprocity,” leads each side of the “Triangle” to 
reciprocate with negative behavior. That (actual) negative behavior likewise creates a 
genuinely negative response, and the result is a downward spiral of dishonesty and erosion 
of trust.  
To break the vicious cycle of mistrust, the PM can focus on making a distinction 
between misperceptions and actual dishonest behavior. One method to accomplish this is to 
seek the opinion of an outside party, one who does not have a stake in any corner of the 
Iron Triangle. Another method is to seek extenuating circumstances that may not be 
obvious, and may influence the other side’s decision-making in a way that creates the 
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appearance of ill intent. Finally, the PM could simply ask the other side to explain their 
behavior. If any of these methods does provide a better understanding, it may become 
apparent that there is a reasonable difference of opinion.  
With the cycle of mistrust broken, an important follow-on step is to trigger a virtuous 
cycle that builds trust. An effective tool to accomplish this is to create the perception of 
fairness, not only in the outcome of a specific interaction, but also in the interaction itself. On 
average, whether or not one side considers an interaction fair depends upon whether that 
side had sufficient opportunity to voice their opinion. Just as important, that side must 
believe that the other side has listened to and seriously considered it. 
Carefully listening to the other side’s perspective gives that side the impression that 
they were treated fairly, and accomplishes three things toward building trust. First, even if 
the outcome of the interaction was undesirable, the other side will have a greater sense of 
satisfaction with the results. Next, the other side will be more likely to follow through on 
agreements that they believed were fair. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the 
chances of successful cooperation with the other side in the future increases. The 
turnaround of the USAF C-17 program illustrates the beneficial effects PMs can achieve 
through this trust-building tool. 
The USAF C-17 Program and the Effects of Building Trust 
In May 1993, the USAF C-17 program was in a state of crisis, and in danger of being 
terminated. The first flight was delayed nearly two years, and the estimated unit cost grew 
from $178.4 million in 1988 to over $500 million by 1993. The sources of these schedule 
and cost overruns could be traced to each corner of the Iron Triangle. First, system 
requirements from the DoD shifted constantly, partially due to new personnel continuously 
being added to the program and the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Next, McDonnell 
Douglas (the prime contractor) repeatedly encountered technical and personnel challenges. 
Finally, shifting priorities in Congress caused funding streams to continually fluctuate or stop 
altogether, keeping the C-17 development and production in a tumultuous and unpredictable 
state. In his testimony before the House and Senate, Undersecretary of Defense John 
Deutch identified a lack of trust as a principal reason for the program’s problems. The 
gridlock stemming from the negative relationship between the U.S. Government and 
McDonnell Douglas prevented the program from successfully moving forward. 
A critical initiative resulting from those observations, which helped transform the C-
17 program from a state of crisis to a path toward success, was to create an open path of 
communication between top-level USAF and McDonnell Douglas leadership. Called “CEO” 
meetings, they had the effect of providing the other side with an opportunity to explain their 
behavior and reach an understanding. With the cycle of mistrust finally beginning to break, 
both sides could create perceptions of fairness by agreeing to substantive concessions. 
Among other things, McDonnell Douglas dropped over $1B in legal claims, and the Air 
Force relaxed numerous specification requirements. The settlement achieved a significant 
change in the management environment of the program. People on both sides stopped 
working as adversaries and, instead, moved forward with a sense of cooperation, 
partnership, and optimism. 
Conclusions 
As the C-17 program demonstrates, the appropriate application of trust-building tools 
can result in a far-reaching program turnaround. Likewise, weapons systems programs 
directly benefit from efforts to ensure leadership continuity, to provide systems engineering 
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training, and to require a minimum level of hands-on training. Despite previous initiatives 
intended to make improvements in these areas, increasing demands for reform in the 
defense acquisition community raises expectations that they be implemented effectively. 
Focusing those efforts on the PM remains critical, since the PM leadership is essential to 
ensuring that warfighters in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard 
receive high-quality weapons systems on time and within budget. Going forward, weapons 
systems consistently developed in this manner will unquestionably contribute to the U.S. 
military’s sustained role as the most capable, powerful, and respected military in the world. 
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• The Defense Acquisition Community
¾ Ch d ith idi th hi h t lit d targe  w  prov ng e g es  qua y an  mos  
cost effective weapons systems.
• Current cost overruns will be unsustainable     .
• The Program Manager’s pivotal role in program 
success makes it an essential area for reform.
¾ Grossly understaffed
¾ Not a professional component
¾ Workforce nearing retirement




• Developing effective PM leadership
¾ Leadership continuity
¾ Systems engineering training  
¾ Hands-on training
¾ T t b ildirus - u ng
• USAF C-17 program turnaround




• Weapon systems spend more time in development 
than an officer’s typical tour.    
¾ Most military PM’s guide a program through only one 
milestone.
¾ C i d i i ffi iont nue  career progress on requ res o cers ga n a 
broad exposure to a variety of programs.
• One solution: shorten program duration    
¾ “Exquisite” systems often exceed technical capabilities
¾ Technological uncertainty translates into delays and 
expense
¾ Neither JCIDS nor PPBES fully address issue
¾ Need to examine requirements process
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• Empower PM’s with system engineering skills to:
¾ Id tif li ti i t len y unrea s c requ remen s ear y
¾ Manage technical risk early
S t i i i d f i iti• ys em eng neer ng n e ense acqu s on
¾ Developmental planning prior to formulation of formal 
requirements
¾ Stresses alternative solutions
¾ Focuses on the development of core technologies      





• The Defense Acquisition University
¾ Training courses 
¾ Experience requirements
¾ Workforce planning 
• Professional military education
• Gaining and applying acquisition experience is an       
essential leadership quality.
¾ In business, experience often equates to sound 
decision making- .
• Opportunities to gain experience must be created 




• How trust is lost
¾ Underlying motivations set conditions for distrust     
9 Congress limiting funding streams to please constituents
9 The military shifting requirements to overwhelm a threat
9 Suppliers promising unrealistic capabilities to increase 
profit
¾ “Norm of reciprocity” creates vicious cycle     
9 Human tendency to exaggerate perceptions of negative 
behavior
9 Tendency to reciprocate with negative behavior
9 Generates a genuinely negative response
9 Downward spiral created eroding trust
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• Breaking the vicious cycle
¾ Di ti i h b t i d d t ls ngu s  e ween perce ve  an  ac ua  
dishonesty
• Triggering a cycle that builds trust     
¾ Create the perception of fairness in interactions 
and outcomes
9 Listening to, and seriously considering, the other 
side’s opinion
o Greater satisfaction with results   
o Improved follow-though on agreements
o Better chance of future successful cooperation
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UNCLAS
The USAF C-17: Background
• A program in crisis
¾ Two-year delay on first flight
¾ Estimated unit cost grew from $178.4 million in        
1988 to over $260 million by 1993
• Principle reason for the program’s     
problems: lack of trust
¾ Stemmed from negati e relationship bet een  v   w  
the US Government and McDonnell Douglas
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UNCLASThe USAF C-17: the Effects of 
Building Trust
• Creation of “CEO” meetings
 
¾ A path of communication between USAF and 
McDonnell Douglas leadership
¾ An opportunity to explain behavior and reach an        
understanding
¾ Broke cycle of mistrust    
¾ Created perceptions of fairness by agreement on 
concessions
• Resulted in shift in management environment
¾ Cooperation, partnership and optimism
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• Key opportunities for effective PM 
development
¾ Leadership continuity, systems engineering 
training, hands-on training, and trust-building
• Acquisition reform efforts must include 
consideration of the PM.
¾ Effective PM leadership is critical to delivering       
systems on time and within budget.
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